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Abstract
This paper studies the evolution of political institutions in the face of conﬂict. We
examine institutional reform in a class of pivotal mechanisms — institutions that behave
as if the resulting policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the
potential population of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. A
rule-of-succession describes the process by which pivotal decision makers in period t + 1 are,
themselves, chosen by pivotal decision makers in period t. Two sources of conﬂict - class
conﬂict, arising from diﬀerences in wealth, and ideological conﬂict, arising from diﬀerences in
preferences are examined. In each case, we characterize the unique Markov Perfect Equilibrium
of the associated dynamic political game, and show that public decision-making authority
evolves monotonically downward in wealth and upward in ideological predisposition toward
the public good. We then examine rules-of-succession when ideology and wealth exhibit
correlation.
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11 Introduction
Institutional reform often occurs when policy reform cannot by resolve conﬂict on its own.
This paper studies the evolution of policy-making institutions in the face of social conﬂict.
Our interest speciﬁcally is in pivotal mechanisms — institutions that behave as if the result-
ing policy were determined by a “pivotal” decision maker drawn from the potential population
of citizens and who holds full policy-making authority at the time. The reform of a pivotal
mechanism therefore describes the change eﬀected by the delegation of authority of one deci-
sion maker to another. In other words, it is as if the individual empowered to make policy
choices has the option of transferring his authority to another individual in the future. We
identify such a transfer as a rule-of-succession.
In some historical cases, this as if reasoning holds quite literally. For example, in monar-
chies, it was widespread practice for the current monarch to choose his successor. This was
often true even when there were “exogenous” rules of monarchical succession. For instance,
historian S. Finer writes of the Han Dynasty in China (202BC-64AD):
“The succession was hereditary. In principle, the emperor could nominate any of
his sons as heir apparent; in practice this was complicated by the fact of his having
an enormous harem. It was for the emperor to designate any one of his women as
his empress, and it was usually understood that it would be one of her sons who
would be appointed crown prince. But this simple rule broke down because, just
as the emperor could create one of his women as empress, so he could demote her
and create another empress in her place.” (Finer 1997, p.483).
In more recent societies (and some ancient ones as well), the as if reasoning also applies
in voting institutions when the voting outcome coincides with the preferred choice of a pivotal
voter. Black (1950), Rothstein (1990), Grandmont (1978), Gans and Smart (1998), Roberts
(1977), and many others have derived conditions under which a Median Voter Theorem holds.
In that case, it is as if some pivotal citizen (usually the median) in some well deﬁned lin-
ear ordering is the temporary “monarch” who can choose the current policy. This citizen’s
preference and wealth characteristics determine his vote, hence indirectly, the policy out-
come. Where the present model is concerned, the multi-dimensional Median Voter Theorems
of Rothstein (1990), Grandmont (1978), Gans and Smart (1998), and Roberts (1977) are of
particular importance since both policy and next period’s policy maker are being chosen at
once.
Arguably, expansions of voting rights in Europe the 19th century can be usefully summa-
rized this way. All over Western Europe, expansion of the franchise occurred. In England, the
1franchise expanded gradually; In 1830, the voting franchise was restricted to 2% of the pop-
ulation. Through a series of gradual reforms, it expanded to Universal suﬀrage by 1928 (see
Lang (1999) and Finer (1997) ). Holland and Belgium oversaw similar gradated expansions.
In Italy in 1849, the voting franchise was granted to citizens above a wealth and educational
threshold. The threshold on education was gradually reduced. In Prussia in the middle of the
19th century, voting was accorded proportionately to the percentage of taxes paid. Later the
franchise was extended without qualiﬁcation to all adult males.1
The present paper does not pose a model to explain a particular set of stylized facts or
historical circumstances. Rather, our goal is to sort through the issues of modeling conﬂict
and its eﬀect on endogenous institutional choice. In this context, we study how the identities
and characteristics of pivotal decision makers evolve in conﬂictual situations.
Why do decision makers’ identities and characteristics change over time? Justman and
Gradstein (1999), Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001, 2005), Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2005),
Gradstein (2003), and Lizzeri and Persico (2004) all adopt the as-if approach to formally
model enfranchisement and democratization as the result of redistributional conﬂict.I n
Acemoglu and Robinson (AR) conﬂict arises from the threat of insurrection by a group of
disenfranchised “have-nots”, who wish to dispossess the enfranchised “haves.” They examine
a model in which an elite makes an one-shot choice of whether to expand the voting franchise
to the peasantry. In contrast to the externally driven explanation of AR, Lizzeri and Persico
(2004) model the franchise expansion as an internal response to ineﬃciencies of political
competition within the elite.
Because of the nature of their models, AR and Lizzeri and Persico do not address issues of
gradual change. Gradualism arises in Roberts (1998,1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev
(2001). Both examine dynamic club formation in games in which players have exogenous
preferences over the size or composition of the group. These models examine endogenous
entry into a group, though not endogenous voting rights per se.2 Gradualism in voting rights
is formalized in Justman and Gradstein (1999) who characterize institutional change under
exogenous costs of disenfranchisement, in Gradstein (2003) who examines choices over institu-
tional quality, and in Jack and Lagunoﬀ (2005) (henceforth JL) who study gradual franchise
expansion in a recursive model that encompasses both external threats of insurrection and
internal dissent amongst the elite. The present study expands on JL, but does not focus
explicitly on the details of the aggregation mechanism - i.e., the details of either the voting
1The electorate was divided into thirds, each third given equal weight in the voting. The wealthiest
individuals who accounted for the ﬁrst third of taxes paid accounted for 3.5% of the population. The next
wealthiest group that accounted for the middle third accounted for 10-12% of the population. The remainder
accounted for the remaining third. See Finer (1997).
2The diﬀerence is that disenfranchised voters are still contributing, tax paying members of society, while
individuals who are excluded from a club do not contribute to the club until they enter. The diﬀerences
account for quite distinct rationales for entry/enfranchisement.
2procedure or the identity of enfranchised individuals.
Finally, Lagunoﬀ (2005a,b) posit a general model of a dynamic political game. Dynamic
political games are games that admit dynamically endogenous choice from a broad array of
institutions. These include changes in the voting rule (e.g., majority vs supermajority rules),
changes in the voting franchise, and expansions/contractions of regulatory authority.
While the present model is a special case of a dynamic political game, it is one that spends
more time on the speciﬁc eﬀects of class and ideological conﬂicts on political reform. Using
functional forms, we derive explicit closed form solutions for an endogenous rule-of-succession.
The fundamental idea is that citizen heterogeneity, naturally leads to disagreements over
public policies. In turn, these disagreements lead to ineﬃcient individual-level decision-making
and policy choices. The delegation of policy-making authority by a current policy maker to a
new policy maker acts as a commitment device which improves the eﬃciency of these decisions,
even as it dilutes/eliminates the authority of the current policy maker.
In the ﬁrst version of the model, wealth heterogeneity induces class conﬂict: in the con-
text of tax-ﬁnanced public goods, individuals with diﬀerent wealth levels diﬀer over their
preferred tax rates. When individual eﬀorts augment the productivity of public spending,
non-cooperatively chosen tax policies and eﬀorts will be ineﬃcient. It is in the interest of the
currently empowered to delegate policy-making authority to another agent in order to elicit
more desirable eﬀort responses. We construct the unique Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE)
in which decision making power is delegated by one pivotal decision maker to the next in a
monotonic fashion. Political evolution is “slow and steady” over time, and there is a down-
ward rule of succession: authority is delegated to individual with successively lower wealth
endowment until (in the limit) policy is chosen by the poorest policy maker.
We would not argue that all or even most successions are, in fact, as slow and steady as
the result suggests. Factors such as technological shocks and demographic shifts all might
contribute to transfers that proceed in ﬁts and starts. It nevertheless illustrates how the
transfers proceed when a form of class conﬂict is the only source of change.
The second version of the model provides an example of ideological conﬂict. In this
formulation, individuals have the same wealth, but diﬀer in their marginal valuations for a
public good, such as state support for religion. As in the ﬁrst example, the productivity of
public spending on the public good is aﬀected by citizens’ eﬀort levels. If decision-making
authority initially rests with those who place a low value on the public good, delegation of
authority is given to individuals with higher valuations. In turn, this induces all individuals
to supply eﬀorts whose aggregate eﬀect is preferred by the current policy maker. Indeed, we
show that the Markov Perfect Equilibrium in this case exhibits an upward rule of succession.
A ﬁnal version of the model combines both class and ideological conﬂict. We show that the
3rule-of-succession may be deﬁned on a composite variable that describes the ratio of wealth to
marginal valuation (ideology) for the public good. The MPE rule of succession is downward,
meaning downward that delegation proceeds toward those with successively lower wealth to
valuation ratios. The dynamics converge to the lowest ratio in the support of the distribution.
However, if there is, as one would suspect, correlation between class and ideology, then this
lowest ratio may still be consistent with high social class (large wealth endowment) or low
marginal evaluation.
While we do not present an explicit model of say, the voting franchise, or of monarchical
succession, we argue that many of the underlying forces that shape change under one type
of institution are present in the other. For example, we can think of the public good as
being the likelihood of political revolution, and voluntary contributions thereto reﬂect either
support for the status quo or, when negative, support for overthrow. If the degree to which
citizens wish to support either cause is correlated with their wealth, then political, as well as
policy reform may arise endogenously.
In the next Section we present an illustrative model of public policy choice and public good
provision that admits both class and ideological conﬂict. Section 3 examines the outcome of
the dynamic political game associated with the class conﬂict, and constructs a unique Markov
Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), characterized by a linear downward rule-of-succession. Section 4
turns to an analysis of the ideological conﬂict example. We characterize a unique MPE which
exhibits an upward rule-of-succession. Section 5 investigates the combined eﬀects of these
two sources of conﬂict, and Section 6 concludes.
2 An Illustrative Model
We model an economy in which public goods provision depends on both involuntary taxation
and voluntary contributions of time and/or eﬀort by individual citizens. Conﬂicts over public
policy - the level of taxation and public good provision - will arise if individuals diﬀer either
in their willingness to pay taxes, or in their valuation of the public good. Public goods
that require both voluntary and involuntary contributions are unexceptional. For example,
museums, universities, local ﬁre ﬁghting services and national parks all utilize voluntary con-
tributions. In many countries tax dollars help to fund an all-volunteer army.3 Public literacy
campaigns and tax deductions for charitable contributions, are further examples.
Consider then a society with n inﬁnitely lived citizens, i =1 ,2,..,n. Time is discrete,
and indexed by t =0 ,1,2,..... Each citizen i is endowed with an asset such as land that
produces an exogenous ﬂow of income yi > 0 each period. (Using the appropriate units, yi
3Though the soldiers may get nominal pay, it is typically not close to a market wage.
4can also be used to measure the value of individual i’s land holding.) Total per-period wealth
is Y =
Pn
i=1 yi. A proportional tax on wealth, whose rate pt is chosen in each period t,
provides a source of public revenue Rt = ptY .
In addition to private wealth, individuals derive utility from a non-depreciable public good,
the stock of which at date t is denoted ωt. Increments to this public good in period t+1 are
produced by combining tax revenues and voluntary contributions of labor eﬀort on the part
of citizens in period t. (Thus the ”returns” to investment in the public good accrue with a
one-period lag.) The eﬀort of citizen i in period t is denoted eit, and the proﬁle of eﬀorts in
period t is et =( e1t,e 2t,...,ent). Aggregate period t eﬀort is Et =
Pn
i=1 eit, and the associated
increment to the public good in period t +1i sR
γ
t Et, with 0 <γ<1. We can interpret this
production function as exhibiting decreasing returns to the tax-ﬁnanced input, or as having
constant returns but in an environment in which there is some ”leakage” of public funds (e.g.,
through distortionary costs of taxation not directly modeled here). The accumulated stock






sEs, 0 <γ<1. (1)
In period t, each citizen i cares about his after-tax wealth yi(1 − pt), his level of eﬀort, eit,
and the accrued value of the public good, ωt. The cost of eﬀort (measured in units of
income) is quadratic and the same for all individuals. On the other hand, the marginal rate
of substitution between after-tax wealth and the public good, which is constant and equal to
αi for citizen i, can potentially diﬀer across individuals. All citizens share the same discount





t[(yi(1 − pt)+αiωt) − e
2
it] (2)
Because of the way current taxes inﬂuence future stocks of the public good, there is a clear
trade-oﬀ between present income and future public good consumption. Let y and ¯ y denote
the smallest and largest land endowments, and α and ¯ α the smallest and largest values of αi,
respectively. Consequently, yi ∈ [y, ¯ y] and αi ∈ [α, ¯ α] for all i.
According to the payoﬀ in (2), there are two possible sources of heterogeneity. First,
individuals potentially diﬀer in land endowments, and hence incomes. Second, they may
diﬀer in their ”ideology,” that is, each may have distinct marginal valuation, αi, for the
public good. These sources of heterogeneity present potential conﬂicts in each individual’s
view of the trade-oﬀs between private and public consumption.
Ultimately, this conﬂict manifests itself in the choice of the tax rate, pt. As an instrument
of public policy, this rate is chosen by some political process, of which there are many. Our
5interest in this paper is not in the details of this process, but rather in the evolution of the
process over time. In particular, we think of policy in a given period as being chosen by an
authorized decision maker, where such authority derives from a political procedure that we
leave unspeciﬁed for now. We argue that the most common political mechanisms feature such
pivotal decision makers. Clearly, dictatorship and monarchy both place ﬁnal decision-making
authority in the hands of an individual. However, marjoritarian rule also does so indirectly
when policies are determined by the median voter.
This individual, who we call the policy-maker, is also permitted to appoint an individual
with policy-making authority in the subsequent period, thereby relinquishing power. Because,
there is only limited degree of heterogeneity among citizens, the current policy maker is not
required to anoint a successor from the set of contributing citizens. Indeed, there are many
instances throughout history where policy makers come from a diﬀerent group or diﬀerent
class of citizens than those who comprise ordinary citizens. The Ptolemies in Egypt, the
Mongolian rulers in China, and the Norman Kings in England were externally imposed decision
makers who eventually held preferences (if not wealth endowments) that mirrored those of
the citizenry. The Eunichs of the Han and Ming dynasties were examples of lower level policy
makers whose wealth proﬁles were not above those that they governed.
We are interested in whether and when this option to relinquish governing power is exer-
cised, and thus under what circumstances and to what degree political succession occurs.
Let i∗
t denote the policy-maker at date t. Let y∗
t and α∗
t denote the land endowment and













In this context, “political succession” refers to the process of transition from policy maker
i∗
t at t to a possibly diﬀerent policy maker i∗
t+1 at date t + 1. To understand how and why
change might occur, and why it might be gradual, we explicitly model this “changing of the
guard.” As in JL, we consider the most direct method whereby i∗
t+1 is chosen by i∗
t. This
model of succession also happens to be historically common, both in traditional monarchies,
but also in democracies in which one political party is dominant. In this case, the current
party boss chooses his successor directly. Post-war Japan and Mexico, for example, eﬀectively
had one-party rule until quite recently.
63 Succession Based on Class Conﬂict
In this Section we consider the case of class conﬂict, assuming away ideological diﬀerences.
Suppose all citizens diﬀer only in land endowments, and are otherwise identical with αi nor-
malized to unity for all i. The aggregate endowment is denoted by Y =
P
i yi.
Policy makers are also assumed to diﬀer only by endowment. Their preferences in (3) also
satisfy α∗
t = 1. For now we assume that y∗
t can take any value in [y, ¯ y]. That is, all policy
makers’ land endowments in the same range of land endowment as the citizenry.4 All citizens
and all potential policy makers therefore value the public good the same way. However, land
endowment heterogeneity induces diﬀerences in the way the trade-oﬀ between present income
and future public goods consumption are viewed. Conﬂict is therefore driven by diﬀerences
in social class.
Without loss of generality, associate each policy maker i∗
t with his land endowment y∗
t.A
policy maker i∗
t therefore chooses pair (pt,y∗
t+1). There should be no confusion when we refer
to y∗
t+1 as the successor of y∗
t. The initial policy maker has exogenous land endowment y∗
0.
To maximize his dynamic payoﬀ, given by (2), an individual (either citizen and/or pol-
icy maker) chooses a strategy that determines a labor eﬀort, a tax policy, or a successor
in each period. The choice in the current period t is contingent on all past realizations
{(eτ,p τ,y∗
τ+1)}τ=0,1,...,t−1. Subgame Perfect equilibria specify strategy proﬁles — proﬁles of
mappings from histories to choices — that are sequentially rational after every possible his-
tory. Because the model is of a society rather than of a small group, we restrict attention
to (stationary) Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE). MPE are Subgame Perfect equilibria in
Markov strategies whereby individuals condition their actions only on directly payoﬀ-relevant
and decision-relevant criteria. The restriction to Markov is quite sensible for modeling behav-
ior of large groups or societies since, in these instances, coordinated behavior on non-relevant
features of a decision is unlikely.
In this present model, Markov strategies depend only the land endowment, y∗
t, of the
current policy maker.5
A Markov strategy in eﬀort is given by σi where labor eﬀort eit = σi(y∗
t) is chosen by
Citizen i given the state y∗
t. Let σ =( σ1,...,σ n). Similarly, ψ is the Markov policy rule,
i.e, tax rate pt = ψ(y∗
t) is chosen in state y∗
t. Finally, µ is the rule-of-succession, whereby
4For the purposes of the analysis, we do not care whether a policy maker is actually a citizen with a land
endowment, or whether the policy maker is a social planner who acts as if his land endowment is y∗
t.
5Two comments are worth noting here. First, given separability between public and private consumption,
the current stock ωt of the public good is not relevant to the anyone’s current decision and may therefore be
excluded from the current state. Second, by the well known One-shot Deviation Principle, Markov strategies
are best responses, in the class of all strategies, to other Markov strategies.
7y∗
t+1 = µ(y∗
t) is the chosen successor of y∗
t.
A strategy proﬁle (σ,ψ,µ ) is a Markov Perfect equilibrium (MPE) if, in each state y∗
t,
each σi(y∗




























































In this class conﬂict environment the MPE policy and eﬀort rules are unique. They can
be constructed directly from the Euler equations. The Euler equations in policy and eﬀort





































Two cases must be distinguished. If γ<1/2, then policy and eﬀort are net substitutes
in the dynamic objective functions of the citizens. Speciﬁcally, the complementary eﬀect of
both inputs in producing future income is outweighed by their current cost. Consequently, a
classic free rider problem arises in the voluntary eﬀort decision: each citizen contributes too
little from the point of view of the representative citizen with endowment y∗
t. That is, if that
citizen could assign tax rates and eﬀort he would assign greater contributions to all citizens.
In this sense, contributions are ineﬃciently small.
By contrast, if γ>1/2, then policy and eﬀort are net complements. The free rider
problem then works in reverse: individuals contribute too much from the point of view of the
8representative citizen with endowment y∗
t. In this sense, contributions are ineﬃciently large.
































t)i fγ<1/2, while e∗
t <σ i(y∗
t)i fγ>1/2.
Additionally, if γ<1/2 then taxation is more costly for higher wealth individuals on
the margin, individuals from the upper wealth strata prefer lower taxes. Therefore, both tax
rates and contributions are decreasing in y∗
t. However, if γ>1/2, then higher tax rates aﬀord
wealthier individuals better incoming-smoothing opportunities. Hence, wealthier individuals
prefer higher tax rates and eﬀort, and so tax rates and contributions are increasing in y∗
t.
Our particular interest is the form of the rule-of-succession, µ. Every MPE generates
a particular sequence of policy makers, i∗
1,i ∗





1), and so on. If it is the case that y∗
0 >y ∗
1 >y ∗
2 > ···, that is, successors are
always chosen from lower social classes than that of the current policy maker, then we will call
this a downward rule-of-succession. Similarly, if y∗
0 <y ∗
1 <y ∗
2 < ···, then µ will be called an
upward rule-of-succession. Naturally, the rule-of-succession need not be either strictly upward
or downward.
Proposition 1 If γ 6=1 /2, then there is a unique MPE in which µ is a downward rule-of-
succession of the form µ(y∗
t)=Cy∗
t with 0 <C<1.
The result asserts a unique Markov Perfect equilibrium in which the rule-of-succession is
downward and linear. Beginning with y∗
0, succession converges to y, the lowest endowment.
In other words, over time, policy reﬂects the preferences of the lowest wealth citizen. The
rule-of-succession is displayed in Figure 1.
The result is veriﬁed by explicitly constructing Markov Perfect equilibrium rule-of-succession
as follows. Let y∗
1,y∗
2,...be a hypothesized equilibrium path of land endowments of the policy
makers starting from an arbitrary y∗
0. Using the MPE policy and eﬀort strategies in (6), we






















































































The second equality utilizes the expression for B in (7). Recall that a policy maker of type
y∗
0 only chooses y∗
1 directly. The choice of y∗
1 = 0 then accounts indirectly for future values
y∗
t,t>1. In order to make this eﬀect explicit, we verify a “guess” that there exists a linear,
downward sloping MPE rule-of-succession. Speciﬁcally, verify y∗
t+1 = Cy∗
t with 0 <C<1.


























The Euler equation in y∗





10where [·] is the expression in (10). Solving for y∗




(1 − δ)2(1 − δC2γ/(2γ−1)))




provided that δC1/(2γ−1) < 1. Our guess is veriﬁed if there is a unique C such that δC1/(2γ−1) <
1 and C is the implicit solution to
C =
(1 − δ)2(1 − δC2γ/(2γ−1)))
nγδ2A2γ−1Y 2γ(1 − δC1/(2γ−1))










We verify that a unique implicit solution to (11) exists. Observe that the left side of (11)
is the identity function in C, while the right side is a function whose value is strictly above 0
at C = 0 and is below 1 at C = 1. Hence, by the Intermediate Value Function, the functions
cross at some value of C between 0 and 1. Moreover, if γ<1/2, then the right-hand side is
strictly decreasing, and so the functions intersect only once at some 0 <C<1. If γ>1/2,
then they intersect twice with a second intersection at some C>1. However, the second
intersection violates the requirement, δC1/(2γ−1) < 1.
Discussion
The intuition is the following. Recall that externalities exist and that their direction
depends on whether γ>1o rγ<1. If γ<1/2, eﬀort externalities are positive. This means
that free riding occurs in equilibrium, i.e, contributions are ineﬃciently small. But in the
γ<1/2 case, wealthy policy makers, i.e., those with higher land endowments, choose lower
tax rates. A wealthy policy maker is therefore better oﬀ by delegating decision authority to a
successor with a lower land endowment. Correctly anticipating that the low land endowment
type chooses higher tax rates, the citizens increase their contributions. Hence, delegation to
a lower socio-economic class mitigates the free rider problem.
Conversely, recall that if γ>1/2 eﬀort externalities are negative. This means that in
equilibrium, “reverse free riding” occurs, i.e, contributions are ineﬃciently large. But be-
cause wealthier policy makers choose higher tax rates, a high endowment individual can, by
strategically delegating decision authority to a poorer type, induce appropriately smaller con-
tributions. Hence, delegation of authority to a lower endowment type can again improve the
high type’s payoﬀ.
In each case, the policy maker is better oﬀ by delegating downward. Clearly a high
endowment policy maker loses something in the delegation decision. Namely, his successor
11chooses an inferior tax rate from the current policy maker’s point of view. The policy maker
gains something, however. His delegation decision partly internalizes the externalities in
voluntary contributions.
Clearly the preferred alternative of a date t policy maker would be to commit to a sequence
of policies in advance. Unfortunately, this is not feasible, and so a “second-best” alternative
is to relinquish power. The delegation of decision-making authority is in itself a form of
commitment, but not nearly as eﬀective as committing to a policy sequence. By delegating
decision authority to a successor, there is no guarantee that the successor will not delegate
further.
In fact, this is precisely what happens: a successor with endowment y∗
1 delegates further
to a successor with an even smaller endowment y∗
2, and so on. Accounting for this fact leads
the current policy-maker to temper his decision. He is more conservative in the designation
of a successor than he otherwise would be if his choice were permanent. This “conservatism”
therefore slows the process of change, making it more gradual.
The recursive structure of our problem therefore implies the gradual political succession.
The gradualism arises from the recursive structure, which is precisely what distinguishes the
present approach, and some of our previous work, from most dynamic delegation models in
the literature.
4 Succession Based on Ideological Conﬂict
Now assume that all decision makers diﬀer only by ideology. In particular, we assume away
class conﬂicts. For citizens, the endowments satisfy yi = y for all i, and taste parameters in
(2) satisfy αi 6= αj for all i,j. Assume α > 0 and denote the aggregate valuation of the public
good by A =
P
i αi.
Policy makers are also assumed to diﬀer only by ideology. Their preferences in (3) satisfy
y∗
t = y all t and α∗
t ∈ [α, ¯ α].
The distinct marginal valuations of each citizen and each policy maker induce diﬀerences
in the way that time trade-oﬀs are viewed. Conﬂict is therefore driven by diﬀerences in
ideologies.
Without loss of generality, associate each policy maker i∗
t with his land endowment α∗
t.A
policy maker i∗
t therefore chooses pair (pt,α ∗
t+1). The initial policy maker has taste parameter
α∗
0.
When diﬀerences are ideological rather than wealth based, Markov strategies must con-
12dition on the taste parameter, α∗
t, of the current policy maker. We keep the same notation
for Markov strategies so as to not complicate things further. Hence Markov strategies are, as
before, given by (σ,ψ,µ ) where, in this case, labor eﬀort, eit = σi(α∗
t) is chosen by Citizen i
given the state α∗
t. Similarly, pt = ψ(α∗
t) is the chosen policy, while α∗
t+1 = µ(α∗
t) determines
the successor who serves as policy maker next period.
























































As with the case of class conﬂict, the MPE rules for policy and eﬀort are unique and may























Notice that the form of the MPE eﬀort and policy rules are almost identical to that of
class conﬂict with one key diﬀerence. The monotone direction is reversed. As before, the
cases of γ<1/2 and γ>1/2 determine the degree to which policy and eﬀort are substitutes
or complements in the dynamic objective functions of citizens. Here, however, if γ>1/2,
then policy and eﬀort are decreasing functions of the valuation of the public good, whereas if
γ<1/2, then policy and eﬀort are increasing in the valuation.
It remains true that policy and eﬀort are net substitutes if γ<1/2 and are net complements
if γ>1/2. But the eﬀects of complements and substitutes work diﬀerently for valuations than
for endowments. Observe that a representative citizen with valuation α∗










In particular, the eﬃcient eﬀort level is the same as in the class conﬂict case if 1/α∗
t = y∗
t.I n






















































Figure 2: Upward Rule-of-Succession under Ideological Conﬂict
lower taxes. Conversely, equilibrium eﬀort is too low when γ>1/2 since individuals fail to
internalize the positive eﬀects of others’ contributions.
As with land endowments, µ is a downward rule-of-succession if the equilibrium path
satisﬁes α∗
0 >α ∗
1 >. . . , and is an upward rule-of-succession if the reverse strict ordering
obtains.
Proposition 2 If γ 6=1 /2, then there is a unique MPE in which µ is an upward rule-of-
succession of the form µ(α∗
t)=Dα∗
t with D>1.
The result asserts a very diﬀerent conclusion than that of class conﬂict. When the source
of the conﬂict is ideological, then there is a unique equilibrium in which the rule-of-succession
is upward and linear. Beginning with α∗
0, succession converges to ¯ α, the highest valuation for
the public good. In other words, over time, policy eventually reﬂects the preferences of the
highest valuation citizen. This rule-of-succession is displayed in Figure 2.
The proof is very similar to that of class conﬂict. As with that case, the construction is
explicit. Let α∗
1,α ∗
2,...be a hypothesized equilibrium path. Using the MPE policy and eﬀort
rules, the policy maker’s objective function for the designated successor, using the Bellman






















































Recall that a policy maker of type α∗
0 only chooses α∗
1 directly. We use the same “guess
and verify” method as before: we guess a rule-of-succession of the form α∗
t+1 = Dα∗
t.T ob ea n
upward rule-of-succession, we posit — and verify — that D>1. Substituting in the constants
from (15), and recalling that
P








provided that δD1/(2γ−1) < 1. Our guess is veriﬁed if there is a unique D such that δD1/(2γ−1) <







Notice that D = 1
C, i.e, the coeﬃcient on the ideological rule-of-succession, is the reciprocal
of the coeﬃcient on the class-based rule-of-succession.
All that is left is to verify that a unique implicit solution to (11) exists satisfying δD1/(2γ−1) <
1 and that this solution entails D>1. Observe that the left side of (17) is the identity func-
tion in D, while the right side is a decreasing function if γ<1/2 and increasing if γ>1/2. If
γ<1/2, then right-side function has value of 2 at D = 0 and has negative values for D large
enough. The Intermediate Value Function therefore implies a unique intersection. Since the
right side exceeds 1 at D = 1, it follows that the intersection occurs at D>1. If γ>1/2,
then right-side function is −∞ at D = 0 and asymptotes to 2 as D becomes large. Again IVT
implies an intersection. In fact, the right hand function intersects the 45◦ line twice, once at
D<1 and another at D>1. Only the larger solution of D>1 satisﬁes δD1/(2γ−1) < 1.
Discussion
The intuition is the following. As before, externalities in eﬀort lead to ineﬃcient contri-
butions. However, here the externalities work in reverse. If γ<1/2, eﬀort externalities
are positive, and so contributions are ineﬃciently small. But because policy makers with
15lower marginal valuation choose lower tax rates than those with higher valuations, strategic
delegation of authority to a higher valuation type can improve the low type’s payoﬀ.
Conversely, if γ>1/2 eﬀort externalities are negative, and so contributions are ineﬃciently
large. But because policy makers with lower marginal valuation choose higher tax rates than
those with higher valuations, strategic delegation of authority to a higher valuation type can
again improve the low type’s payoﬀ.
As before, full commitment to an inﬁnite sequence of policies is not feasible, and so strategic
delegation to a successor is the “second-best” alternative. Just as before, the continued
delegation by future successors to their successors induces conservatism in the choice of the
present policy maker. Hence, the process is gradual.
5 Class vs Ideology
Both sources of conﬂict may be combined. Using the same type of Euler equation derivations,





This state expresses the income value of the public good to a Citizen i whose land endowment
is yi. β∗
t is the public good desired by policy maker i∗





























and the MPE rule-of-succession is µ(β∗
t)=Cβ∗
t where C<1 and is the same C that implicitly
solved (11) in the class conﬂict case.
Suppose, ﬁrst, that policy makers can be drawn from all possible values in [y, ¯ y]×[α, ¯ α], the
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that the rule-of-succession converges to the β∗ satisfying β = y/¯ α.
That is, succession proceeds until the chosen policy maker is the one from the lowest economic
class who, at the same time, has the highest marginal valuation for the public good. Figure
3 displays this case. In it, equivalence classes of decision makers consist of diﬀerent types






















































Figure 3: Rule-of-Succession Converges to β∗
public good is the same. The downward rule-of-succession implies that this society gradually
delegates to the policy maker with characteristics, (y, ¯ α).
This is not an unreasonable scenario in cases where the policy maker is a median voter, and
succession corresponds to voting over expansion of voting franchise. Arguably, the progressive
expansions in 19th century Western Europe were made to lower socio-economics groups with
a greater preference for an expanded welfare state.
A more likely scenario is one in which class and ideology are correlated. Naturally, this
depends on the type of public good. Public transportation and public health insurance are
examples of public goods preferred most likely by poorer citizens, whereas interstate highways,
art museums, and national defense (because the rich have more to lose) are examples of
public goods preferred most likely by wealthier citizens. Figure 4 displays one form of perfect
correlation between wealth levels and marginal valuations. The nature of the correlation is
such that the MPE path converges to a pair (α, ¯ y) so that the policy maker remains in the
highest social class.
Finally, consider the case of imperfect correlation, expressed in terms of a limited support
in the shape of an “egg” in Figure 5. In that case, the dynamics of the MPE rule-of-succession














Figure 4: Perfectly Correlated Types and Convergence to β∗
and the boundary of the support.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the nature of rules-of-succession in the face of social conﬂict. We ﬁnd
that class conﬂict gives rise to downward rules-of-succession while ideological conﬂict gives
rise to upward rules-of-succession.
A question naturally arises as to what “downwardness” and “upwardness” actually mean.
In our context, however, the interpretation seems clear. The model posits diﬀerent sources
of conﬂict that amount to the same thing. Namely, citizens have conﬂicting evaluations of
the trade oﬀ between one’s own private wealth and the public good (whatever the latter
happens to be). The “downwardness” in social class refers to the natural ordering of wealth
endowments. The wealth endowment is simply the marginal cost of contributing toward the
public good. The “upwardness” of ideology refers to the ordering on public good valuations.
These valuations are simply the marginal beneﬁt that an individual places on the combined
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Figure 5: Correlation and Smaller Support
The model is intended to be suggestive rather than deﬁnitive in its predictions for institu-
tional change. A large number of mitigating factors are excluded for the sake of tractability.
Among the most important is technological progress, speciﬁcally, progress that changes ei-
ther the wealth distribution or the individual trade oﬀs between public and private goods.
Demographic changes also matter. As a society’s population density changes, the eﬀects of
congestion and urbanization create diﬀerent needs than those of traditional agrarian societies.
What the model does do is illustrate the eﬀect of a particular set of conﬂicts, taken in
isolation, on a particular set of institutional modiﬁcations. We think this exercise has some
merit, but enormous amounts of work remain to be done. In their new book, Acemoglu
and Robinson (2005) describe idiosyncratic factors in a country’s development that help to
determine its current political system. Our hope is that models can clarify precisely the nature
of these factors. We foresee a broad need for future modeling along these lines.
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